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Section 3: Paper 7 
 
The Ties That Blind: The Moral Value (and Disvalue) of Anonymity 
Julie Ponesse 
Western University 
 
Talk of anonymity is ubiquitous in the twenty-first century. We speak of “anonymous 
sources” and “anonymous donations,” are comforted by “anonymity promises” and “anonymity 
guarantees,” and sometimes agree to speak only “on condition of anonymity.” We are told that 
anonymity is valuable, and sometimes indispensible, for securing personal information,i 
enhancing liberty and autonomy,ii protecting rights to privacy and free speech,iii and even 
supporting climates of trust and openness. In particular contexts, anonymity is prized for its 
ability to further the following ends: 
(i) to procure information that wouldn’t be forthcoming without it (as with 
whistleblowers, witnesses, and those giving testimony), 
(ii) to express unpopular or dissenting opinions without fear of reprisal or retaliation, 
(iii) to protect those who are at a strategic disadvantage (as when women apply for 
jobs in still male-dominated fields), 
(iv) to encourage the donation of money and scarce resources, including blood, tissue 
and reproductive material (gametes and organs),  
(v) to ensure fairness and impartiality (as with the blind review of scholarly articles), 
(vi) to provide protection from persecution in climates of oppression, and 
(vii) to enable individuals to in any way live covertly or reclusively in the social 
sphere.  
 
However, it is not clear that anonymity is always employed for such noble ends or has 
such beneficial results. It can subvert more authentic forms of communication and facilitate 
harms that would not be possible, or choice-worthy, without it. It can promote the promulgation 
of hate speech, allow identity thieves to get close to their victims, and enable cyber bullies and 
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harassers to behave irresponsibly on the Internet. Though anonymity is often connected with 
goods—such as freedom and security—that have proven to be difficult or even impossible to 
attain without it, we have also seen a sharp increase in subversive behaviours perpetrated under 
the cloak of anonymity. Harassment and stalking, rudeness and indecency, mischief, deception, 
gossip-mongering, and the exploitation and homogenization of peoples all thrive better in an 
atmosphere of anonymity than without it. Because anonymity alleviates accountability and can 
even provide complete impunity, it is especially appealing for criminals and evil-doers, and can 
even seduce the average person to act as the morally worst version of herself. Given these 
tensions, it is unclear whether anonymity is a value worth preserving and, if so, what are the 
conditions that make it warranted.  
This paper has two main aims: one is to understand the mechanisms that allow anonymity 
to facilitate both good and bad ends; the other is to use this understanding to determine the value 
of anonymity relative to its disvalue across a variety of moral and socio-political domains. 
Building on previous workiv in which I characterize anonymity by what I call the ‘central 
anonymity paradigm,’ I argue here that anonymity is primarily instrumentally valuable as a 
strategic device to procure some other valued good or set of goods, and is justified derivatively 
to the extent that it successfully achieves this end. Here, I leave open the question whether 
anonymity is intrinsically good and, in the final sections, I give reasons why it should sometimes 
be resisted. My argument proceeds in four stages: first, I describe four domains in which the 
tensions between the value and disvalue of anonymity can be felt; second, I briefly present the 
central anonymity paradigm; third, I draw on Kathleen Wallace’s taxonomy of three kinds of 
anonymity (agent anonymity, recipient anonymity, and procedural anonymity) to show how 
anonymity is typically achieved in the paradigmatic cases, and why it is so effective at achieving 
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and securing certain ends; and finally, I draw on the concept of “intimate anonymity” from the 
fields of architecture and urban design as a model for anonymity relations that preserves the 
individualizing benefits of anonymity—security, privacy, freedom, etc.—while encouraging 
individuals to form meaningful relations with others that support intimacy, trust and community. 
I begin with four anonymity tensions. 
Four Anonymity Tensions 
Anonymity can function to support either purely good, or purely pernicious, ends. It can 
support fairness in voting procedures, for example, but also allow online stalkers to appear 
innocuous to their potential victims. However, it is also true that, in a variety of contexts, the 
very anonymizing mechanisms that produce benefits also themselves yield harmful results, 
raising questions about the true value of anonymity, and about how to isolate anonymity’s 
benefits from its costs, preserving one while resisting the other. Consider the following four 
examples that reveal a deep tension over the value of anonymity. 
1. Anonymity on the Internet 
The growth of the Internet, alone, has in historically unprecedented ways made it possible 
to anonymize ourselves to both good and bad ends. Numeric and non-numeric pseudonyms (such 
as usernames and PINS), IP addresses, and “ECash” transactions all help to ensure privacy while 
navigating the web. The Internet also allows us to create online identities, distinct or fractured 
from our offline identities, which can help those who are oppressed, weak, guilty or victimized to 
express unpopular opinions, confessions, and revelations in safe spaces. For these purposes, it 
seems that the “tools and applications to achieve anonymity are more important than ever.”v Yet, 
the same technology that protects us from others also helps to create what Martha Nussbaum and 
Saul Levmore call “the dark side of the Internet,” making us more vulnerable to those whose 
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abuses anonymity makes possible—fraudsters and identity thieves, trolls and griefers,vi rumor-
mongers and online stalkers. There is also a more general worry that anonymity runs counter to 
individual needs for freedom and expression, or to the general spirit of the information age in 
which “[i]nformation wants to be free,”vii accessible to all and easily transferrable. Taking this 
idea further, Diane Zimmerman claims that society has a “powerful countervailing interest in 
exchanges of accurate information about the private lives and characters of its citizenry”.viii 
While unregulated discourse on the Internet arguably enhances freedom of speech, a wholly 
unregulated Internet has proven to create breeding grounds for offensive conduct.  
2. Anonymity and Journalism 
In journalism, anonymity has long been employed both to obtain unique kinds of 
information and to protect the informants who provide it. It is standard practice among British 
news publications such as The Economist to run their editorials anonymously, in part because 
“collective voice and personality matter more than the identities of individual journalists”.ix But 
there is a growing trend among editors, in the U.S. especially, away from anonymously edited 
material. In August 2010, The Buffalo News discontinued anonymous online editing as a way to 
bring accountability to a practice that often turns “offensive, sometimes reaching the depths of 
racist and homophobic discourse.”x  
The tension over the value of anonymous speech is felt in the political sphere as well. 
One view is that information speaks for itself and that “The inherent worth of . . . speech in terms 
of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether 
corporation, association, union, or individual.”xi Another is that anonymous speech helps to 
constrain the democratic forces that can marginalize individuals. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission (1995), the Supreme Court overturned a statute requiring all campaign advertising 
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to identify the communication’s author by name. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice 
John Paul Stevens wrote: 
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent 
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield 
from the tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of 
Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from 
retaliation--and their ideas from suppression--at the hand of an intolerant society.xii 
 
While anonymity is often valued for its ability to protect individuals, however, suspicions 
rise in cases where groups (if they are invulnerable ones) assume anonymity for strategic 
political ends. During a 2010 speech in Portland, Oregon, President Obama attacked pro-
Republican groups who were spending campaign funds from anonymous donors, calling this 
practice a “threat to our democracy.”xiii 
3. Anonymity in Health Care 
In health care, promises of anonymity are thought to be important, and sometimes 
essential, for providing individuals a safe haven for recovery from certain socially stigmatizing 
conditions, such as alcoholism, or to seek testing for them, as with anonymous HIV/AIDS 
testing, which has become a particularly controversial practice. While anonymity encourages 
testing by individuals who have concerns about disclosing their HIV/AIDS status,xiv it has also 
been criticized for allowing persons with AIDS to engage in dangerous, morally irresponsible 
behavior without accountability and for undermining the need for aggressive public health 
surveillance of severe illnesses without true curesxv).  
4. Anonymity as a Fictional Device 
Finally, consider two fictional examples of anonymity that have driven a wealth of 
discourse in their respective domains.xvi First, Plato’s story of Gyges in the second Book of the 
Republic connects anonymity with injustice by suggesting that anyone who is free to be unjust 
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under the cloak of invisibility would do so. Glaucon claims that, if two men were given rings that 
would render them invisible:  
Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust;… And this we may 
truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that 
justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that 
he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust… If you could imagine any one obtaining this 
power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, 
he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot… (Republic 359a-
360d)   
 
Though Glaucon assumes that anonymity masks the subversive goals we all naturally have, John 
Rawls privileged anonymity for its ability to suspend the personal biases that might prevent 
choosers in the original position from selecting fair principles of justice. The ‘veil of ignorance’ 
would create a suspended state of anonymity in which hypothetical choosers are shielded from 
the personally identifiable information that may bias their decisions. 
Across each of these contexts, the very mechanisms that help to create beneficial states of 
anonymity can also foster morally destructive anonymity relations. Without limits, boundaries or 
a standard of justification, anonymity can enable shame-free zones in which morally good, but 
also impulsive and self-interested, behavior can fly under the radar of social constraint. Given 
this, is anonymity a value worth preserving? If so, is it valuable intrinsically or simply 
instrumentally as a way to obtain or maintain other values? To answer these questions, we first 
need a clear understanding of what anonymity is, to which I turn next. 
 
The Central Anonymity Paradigm and Three Anonymity Types 
Anonymity is often understood either very narrowly as namelessness (as the etymology 
of the word suggests) or very broadly as a phenomenon of being in any way unknown. Yet, if we 
are to capture all of the relevant relationships of which anonymity is a feature but also to delimit 
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anonymity relations from other that involve unknowability such as privacy relations, I think we 
need both to free it from a strict identification with namelessness and to specify in what sense it 
is a kind of unknowability. To situate anonymity between the concepts of namelessness and 
unknowability, I understand anonymity as the result of a specific exercise of control in which 
some feature of an otherwise known person fails to be associated with the network of properties 
that constitute that person.xvii Hence, in anonymity relations: 
Some property p of anonymous person A is concealed from B (the potential knower) such 
that B fails to associate p with A as a well-defined set of properties.  
 
Where the anonymity relation holds, there is (i) a property p that could belong to A, and (ii) a 
plurality of subjects to whom p could also belong such that B is unable to identify p with A.xviii 
Hence, anonymity does not require that a person’s identifying information is withheld from the 
public sphere; it needs just to be dissociated from the person to whom it belongs.xix As such, 
anonymity is relative to particular networks of properties, on the one hand, and networks of 
persons, on the other, which allows for the substitutability of the anonymous person with others 
with whom she could reasonably be confused. As such, anonymity is a state that could not exist 
apart from epistemic relations among persons or in an epistemic vacuum; rather, it is 
characteristically interpersonal and relative to particular contexts of knowing. 
There are, I take it, a variety of purposes for which anonymity conceived of in this way 
may be sought (to protect privacy, avoid reprisal, or to enable uninhibited creative expression in 
oppressive contexts) and many means by which anonymity can be accomplished (some formal, 
others informal; some chosen, others spontaneous). Since distinct ethical issues may be raised by 
each of these, I draw on Kathleen Wallace’s taxonomy of anonymity types to delimit the general 
class of anonymity relations into the following three types: 
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1. agent anonymity (anonymity for the sake of furthering action by the anonymous person, 
e.g. anonymous donors, authors, bidders), 
 
2. recipient anonymity (anonymity for the sake of preventing or protecting the anonymous 
person from the agency of others, e.g. anonymizing HIV tests to protect potentially  
positive clients from stigmatization), and 
 
3. procedural (or third-party) anonymity (anonymity for the sake of preserving procedural 
integrity, such as to maintain fairness in voting or peer review processes).xx 
 
Now that we have a clear sense of the nature of anonymity and its general sub-types, we are 
positioned to examine the value of each of these kinds of anonymity. I begin by considering the 
value and disvalue of agent anonymity.  
The Moral Value [and Disvalue] of Anonymity 
Agent Anonymity 
In the examples of agent anonymity that we have seen, anonymity functions in some way 
to increase the dimension or virility of a person’s own agency. This can support beneficial kinds 
of agency (as with many instances of anonymous donation) but in the harmful cases, anonymity 
can create a special sort of license to perform moral transgressions we might otherwise resist. 
What are the mechanisms that create this special license, enabling anonymity to intensify the 
perpetration of harm?  
Surely, one reason is that an awareness of one’s anonymity lessens a person’s inhibitions, 
thereby increasing the harm she feels she can get away with. Stanley Milgram’s research 
revealed that allowing people to think that they are not responsible for their own decisions and 
actions (because, in that case, an authority figure has assumed responsibility) produces 
irresponsible decisions and actions. We act much worse under the shelter of anonymity, it seems, 
than when we expect to be made personally accountable. But this only explains why the harms 
anonymous persons commit go unacknowledged or unpunished, and hence why they can occur, 
 133 
 
but not why an awareness of one’s anonymity can seduce the average person to act as a morally 
worst version of herself. 
In addition to increasing the harm we can get away with, anonymity also seems to 
increase the harm we want to get away with. In a 1976 study that involved Halloween trick-or-
treaters, children arriving at a test house were asked to take only one piece of candy from each 
person who offered it.xxi Those who were alone and whose identities were known (they were not 
hidden by masks, makeup, etc.) took more than one candy only 8% of the time. However, when 
the children arrived as a group and their identities were concealed, 80% took more than one 
candy. Anonymity, it seems, can free us to do what we really want to do and sometimes what we 
really want is to act worse than we would if we felt the full force of behaviour-constraining 
social pressures. What we would do well to explain, therefore, is why anonymizing ourselves 
allows us to see ourselves differently as moral agents, for whom senses of right and wrong 
somehow lose force.  
Recall that the concept of anonymity I am working with frames anonymity as a 
mechanism that dissociates us from the properties that make us individuals. Since being an 
individual moral agent means (at least) having the capacity to empathize with close and distant 
others, and for whom accountability for present actions has a certain moral force, the de-
individualizing effect of anonymization makes it less likely that we will motivated by the moral 
powers we would otherwise have, such as empathy and the social feelings that ground a sense of 
obligation. The power of de-individuation is suggested by the following fictional example. In To 
Kill a Mocking Bird, Scout happens upon a mob about to lynch an innocent man. When she calls 
Mr. Cunningham by his name, thereby reminding him of his identity and individuality, he is 
suddenly self-aware, which defuses the mob’s intended violent act.xxii So it seems that one reason 
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anonymity can incline a person to behave as a morally worse version of herself is that it can 
decrease her awareness of herself as a moral agent, with her particular history, debts and 
obligations, dispositions and commitments, and sense of moral purpose. Because anonymity can 
fracture us in these ways, and since having integrity is a matter (at least) of maintaining an 
harmonious and integrated self, it is unsurprising that a lack of moral integrity would accompany 
states of anonymity.  
Furthermore, we are more likely to behave badly when those against whom we are acting 
are anonymous to us. Real-life scenarios show that, when we cannot fully see the other person—
both literally and figuratively—our inhibitions are lessened, and our empathy and compassion 
are compromised. For example, studies have also shown that the psychological trauma for a pilot 
who drops a bomb on a city is often less than for a ground soldier who has had to shoot one man 
at point-blank range.xxiii This de-individualizing power can also have a dehumanizing effect by 
preventing us from recognizing the other as one who ought not be harmed, or harmed in certain 
ways. Abu Ghraib prison’s lack of resources—including translators, sufficient food and clothing, 
etc.—in addition to the de-individualizing effects of the military, made it easier for the military 
personnel to treat the prisoners as “the enemy.” Not seeing the “others” (in this case, the 
prisoners) as whole persons made it is easier to treat them as non-persons (as collateral damage, 
the target, animals, etc.). In general, by de-individualizing both ourselves as agents and those 
against whom we act, anonymity arms us with greater executive power enhancing not only the 
opportunity, but perhaps also the desire, to harm others.  
These examples show that anonymity is often valued by agents as a strategic device to 
procure or preserve something else they value (even if the thing they value is not itself valuable) 
when procuring or preserving that thing is not desirable outside conditions of anonymity. Since 
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agent anonymity serves to conceal the true nature or dimension of one’s agency when operating 
in the public sphere, agent anonymity is often instrumentally valuable for allowing a person to do 
something she would hesitate to do in public. As Charles Fried says,  
If we thought that our every word and deed were public, fear of disapproval or more 
tangible retaliation might keep us from doing or saying things which we would do or say if 
we could be sure of keeping them to ourselves or within a circle of those who we know 
approve or tolerate our tastes.xxiv  
 
Anonymity employed as an instrument for facilitating insidious actions will, of course, be 
unjustified. Acting anonymously does not give us special moral license to do what we know, or 
should know, to be wrong, or what we would lack moral license to do without it.   
But what about when we hesitate to do in public what we know to be right? Some 
negative socio-political climates make otherwise desirable actions undesirable or impossible, and 
anonymity can facilitate in these climates what would be rational or commendable to do outside 
of them. Anonymous speech, for example, has often enabled individuals to avoid persecution 
when voicing dissenting religious or political views in climates of oppression, as when Josef 
Ginsberg published his revisionist account of the Holocaust using the pseudonym “J.G. Burg” to 
avoid persecution. To the degree that anonymity facilitates what would be rational or permissible 
to do outside of conditions of oppression, for example, but which are currently impeded by “all-
things-considered” negative social factors, it will be justified. Since these actions are desirable in 
their own right, we can justify agent anonymity derivatively and to the extent that it is a 
mechanism for creating a moral space in which agents are able to do what is morally permissible 
or required. I now turn to the value of recipient anonymity. 
Recipient Anonymity 
Considering that the primary aim of recipient anonymity is to protect or prevent an 
individual from the potentially harmful effects of the agency of others, and hence to increase 
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interpersonal invulnerability, it is often valued as a strategic form of self-defense. To the degree 
that self-defense mechanisms are justified, recipient anonymity will be justified in cases where it 
is (a) a unique strategy of protection that (b) prevents someone from the foreseeable harm they 
may receive from another, and (c) the value of this protection is not counterbalanced by 
something of greater disvalue.  
Notice that, since recipient anonymity is justified to the extent that it protects individuals 
from being harmed by others, presumably recipient anonymity would be unnecessary in a world 
in which persons pose no threat to one another. The social dynamics of our culture influence 
whether we do, and need to, assume and preserve anonymity. A woman applying for a job in a 
male-dominated discipline where there is clear evidence of gender discrimination will justifiably 
seek the guarantee of recipient anonymity to keep her name anonymous. But the need, and hence 
the justification, for anonymity will decrease proportionately with the decrease in discriminatory 
hiring contexts. It would be very strange, and perhaps inappropriate, for a job candidate to try to 
conceal her gender in a hiring context in which there is no gender discrimination. In more 
intimate contexts, individuals may feel that a certain degree of anonymity offers protection, 
especially in the early stages of a relationship, when being fully known to others makes us more 
vulnerable than we want to be. But anonymity that is preserved for too long or for the wrong 
reasons can undermine the potential for trust, dependency and support in personal relationships. 
And, since there is a tendency to mistrust those who make an effort to remain anonymous for too 
long, for the wrong reason, or for no apparent reason at all, anonymity might actually undermine 
creating the sort of trusting, fair context that would obviate the need for it. A variety of 
complications are sure to arise in the agent-recipient axis, and balancing benefits and harms to 
each will be no easy task. For one thing, since agent anonymity prevents others from seeing us as 
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we really are, thereby disarming the recipients’ defenses they are sometimes better off to have, 
agent anonymity will need to be balanced against the threat it poses to others. And, conversely, 
because adopting recipient anonymity can be accompanied by the erosion of identity, or at least 
lead to more impoverished ways of knowing others, it will need to be rigorously scrutinized in 
relation to these concerns.  
Third Party (procedural) Anonymity 
When, and under what conditions, is procedural anonymity justified? Since its primary 
aim is to preserve the integrity or validity of a process or procedure—such as to secure accurate, 
non-biased results—and since this is often valued to the degree that it protects individuals, one 
way to justify procedural anonymity will be derivatively, as a proxy form of recipient anonymity. 
Given this, procedural anonymity will be justified to the extent that it achieves recipient 
anonymity when it would not be possible or desirable for individuals to do so for themselves, as 
when trial organizers blind recipient information from investigators. 
But procedural anonymity can also be a mechanism for producing or maintaining things 
that are good in their own right such as objectivity and fairness, separate from the fairness that is 
owed to individuals. Anonymous voting procedures help not just to prevent unfairness to 
particular citizens who may be excluded from the process, for example, but also to ensure that 
the result is balanced, representative, and democratic. In the case of journal refereeing, we want 
blind review to result in the selection of the best set of articles, not just to avoid discriminating 
against authors. But these kinds of procedural anonymity may also have a disvalue to the degree 
that they threaten the cultivation of certain other-regarding virtues, such as tolerance, which 
require us to embrace differences of which we must first be aware. As Martha Nussbaum says in 
her insightful book, Not For Profit: 
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Every modern democracy is also a society in which people differ greatly along many 
parameters, including religion, ethnicity, wealth and class, physical impairment, gender, 
and sexuality, and in which all voters are making choices that have a major impact on the 
lives of people who differ from themselves.xxv  
 
To the degree that we are unaware of the genuine differences between ourselves and fellow 
citizens, we may be unable to cultivate the important political virtues (such as tolerance) which 
enable us to honour the obligations of democratic citizenship.  
I have argued that anonymity, understood as the intentional concealment of the personally 
identifying features of an otherwise well-defined person, is valuable primarily as an instrument 
to procure or preserve other things we value, such as fairness or enhanced agency. The 
justification of anonymity will decrease proportionately as it facilitates harmful kinds of 
agency—such as those that involve theft, deception, harassment, and injustice—or when it 
supports unfounded recipient anonymity. Though I said earlier that anonymity would be neither 
needed nor appropriate in a world in which we were invulnerable to one another, the reality of 
our world is that there are many social contexts of which anonymity is currently an intractable 
feature. Furthermore, a certain fact about human existence, namely that we are not perfect, 
makes anonymity a value we are unlikely to want to give up altogether. In Privacy and Freedom, 
Alan Westin says: “Only those who can sustain an absolute commitment to the ideal of 
perfection can survive total surveillance. This is not the condition of men in ordinary society.”xxvi 
Given that anonymity is practically necessary, yet threatens more intimate ways of knowing 
others, we have reason to find a way to resist anonymity to the degree that it is possible and to 
find the best way to harness its benefits without succumbing to its hazards. In the following 
section, I consider how we might adopt a kind of constrained anonymity so as to meet these 
goals.  
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I n t i m a t e  A n o n y m i t y  
To balance the hazards and benefits of anonymity, I suggest that we borrow a concept 
from the fields of urban planning and architectural design. In the 1960s, many city planners and 
architects were disillusioned with the reality of the modern city. While it was thought that 
humans certainly can benefit from urbanization (by taking advantage of vocational specialization 
and large-scale, collective projects), increasing urbanization was outstripping these advantages, 
leading to individual feelings of loss and alienation, claustrophobia, and a lack of a sense of 
community or the opportunity for full individual self-expression.  
Some years ago, Israeli architect Hillel Schocken proposed a model for human habitation 
called “intimate anonymity”xxvii aimed at bridging the gap between individuals’ competing needs 
for community and solitude. Schocken re-imagined the city as a place that allows human beings 
to form relations with others at various levels of intimacy while remaining entirely anonymous. 
On Schocken’s view, a successful city is one in which, when exiting a private domain into the 
public domain, a person should see people around him but know nothing about them. To achieve 
this, Schocken suggested that we think of urban public space as a series of networks that allow 
random movement of people through them, increasing the opportunities to engage with others. 
According to Schocken, it is the lack of random movement that renders the piazza of Saint 
Peter’s Cathedral in Rome, although impressive in scale and aesthetic value, an inferior urban 
public space, compared to the Piazza Navona, composed of mundane urban architecture of little 
artistic value. To facilitate the intimate and simultaneous sharing of public space by anonymous 
people, Schocken also valued “mixed uses” (common in the older urban fabric) rather than 
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zoning (practiced in post-industrial planning), the idea being that geo-location can, itself, be 
identifying. People walking in a zoned “university campus” or “business district,” for example, 
reveals something about their occupation and, to a degree, their social standing, thereby 
sacrificing a portion of their anonymity.  
A p p l y i n g  “ i n t i m a t e  a n o n y m i t y”  
How might we integrate some of the insights from Schocken’s concept of “[t]the intimate 
and simultaneous sharing of public space by anonymous people”xxviii into our analysis of 
anonymity, more generally? Though anonymity is an intractable feature of certain social 
situations, it is also relative to particular contexts and persons who can be known, and hence we 
can have no absolute expectation of anonymity and no absolute right to it; a certain degree of 
anonymity in social relations is an inevitable feature of social life. Furthermore, intimacy is 
important for the development and sustenance of certain kinds of personal relationships. So how 
can we encourage intimacy across a variety of social contexts in the face of real anonymity 
demands?  
As we have seen, there are a variety of contexts in which anonymity flourishes. Some are 
individual while others are collective; some anonymize agents while others anonymize 
recipients; and some are standard or assumed while others are unassumed. Since harmful forms 
of agent anonymity involve the concealment of information a recipient is better off to have, and 
since a person will likely be more harmed by this lack of information if she is unaware that she is 
lacking it—as when trolls infiltrate online message boards—I suspect that encouraging contexts 
in which anonymity is assumed will help to create the kind of intimacy Schocken describes. 
Assumed or professed anonymity will better support intimacy by diminishing the worry that the 
other is hiding things that should not be hidden. Assuming (and declaring) recipient anonymity 
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(such as with anonymously refereed articles) will be a good way to enhance a feeling of security, 
privacy, protection and intimacy by fostering a context in which those values are assumed. This 
may explain why distress call lines work so well, not just because people feel less vulnerable to 
strangers who they know can’t ridicule them or interfere in their lives in certain ways, but also 
because there is a presumption of honesty from the start. 
I suspect another reason why assumed anonymity is able to create intimacy in these 
contexts is because they are, to a degree, mixed use (rather than zoned) spaces that, as Schocken 
claimed, make us less identifiable and therefore less vulnerable. Though distress call lines such 
as Peterborough, Ontario’s “Telecare” (in operation since 1977) provide anonymous and strictly 
confidential service for emotional problems in particular, individuals are welcome to call with 
any number of problems including those related to relationships, work, finances, anxiety, 
alcohol, gambling, etc. In part because the caller cannot be seen and in part because of the 
distress line’s “mixed use” nature, a caller is able to achieve a greater level of intimacy than, in 
all likelihood, she could have with known others while preserving her anonymity. I suspect this 
also explains the popularity of sites such as “Postsecret.com,” an online community art project to 
which people mail their secrets anonymously on one side of a homemade postcard. As George 
Simmel says of the intimacy and acceptance created in this kind of context: “The stranger who 
moves on often receives the most surprising openness – confidences which sometimes have the 
character of a confessional and which would be carefully withheld from a more closely related 
person.”xxix  
This phenomenon of intimacy with a stranger will be familiar to anyone who has found 
themselves sharing intimate disclosures about their most embarrassing secrets to a stranger with 
whom they have been thrown together on a plane. As Jeffrey Rosen says in The Unwanted Gaze, 
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“Confessions to strangers are costless, precisely because the social disapproval of strangers can 
be ignored, unlike the social disapproval of those whom we encounter on a daily basis.”xxx Of 
course, there may be limits to this kind of discourse: one would not want to subsist on intimately 
anonymous relationships alone, and there may be concerns about the depths to which one can 
truly know another, even in intimately anonymous relationships. To have a substantial exchange, 
some feel that you, in your full person, need to be fully present. The Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitutionxxxi (the right to face one’s accuser) is 
grounded in part in assumptions about the irreplaceable authenticity of “face-to-face” 
interactions. And this, once again, emphasizes the importance of balancing competing values in 
anonymity relationships.  
Conclusion 
As I have argued, anonymity is both essential for, and a threat to, moral and political 
agency, broadly construed. Anonymity can threaten moral values and undermine moral powers, 
but it may also support these by increasing our fullness or effectiveness as a person. My 
suspicion is that increasing contexts of assumed anonymity, as well as “mixed use” spaces that 
facilitate interactions between anonymous persons, will help to support the freedom, trust, and 
security for which anonymity relations are so valued. But we also need to acknowledge the 
potential hazards of unbridled anonymity and to resist unreflectively embracing anonymity. 
Furthermore, since anonymity is justified relative to contexts in which it is instrumentally useful 
or necessary, we should not think of ourselves as having an absolute right to anonymity.xxxii 
Rather, the benefits of anonymity must be carefully weighed against its costs in particular 
contexts, and we must be willing to relinquish anonymity when it is no longer needed or when 
doing so favours more intimate kinds of relationships we (and others) are better off to have. We 
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need a certain assurance of anonymity in order to feel free, and to act freely, in our current 
society. But we must also recognize that there is a gap between how things are and how they 
should be, and try to imagine a more just world in which we no longer find ourselves in positions 
of vulnerability relative to one another. We would do well, in other words, to channel our 
energies into creating a society in which the systemic causes of anonymity are mitigated for the 
sake of more intimate ways of knowing one another.  
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